The February 1 joint US-Israeli kinetic strike on Iran—which killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and top officials—has triggered a jagged aerial siege against the Arab Gulf. The White House withheld advance notice of the attack from its regional partners, leaving them to absorb the brunt of the Iranian response. While the operation was ostensibly aimed at Tehran, the physical fallout has settled heavily on the non-combatant neighbors to the south.
Since the onset of hostilities, Iran has launched at least 380 missiles and 1,480 drones at the five Arab Gulf states.
The UAE has been hit by more Iranian projectiles than Israel, forcing Emirati officials to broker independent "backchannel" deals with Tehran to maintain a skeletal flying corridor.
Gulf leadership characterizes the US military presence as a hollow shield that offers proximity to danger without the benefit of prior warning or defensive density.
The Friction of Neglect
The mood in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is brittle. Sources within two Gulf governments describe the US handling of the war as a breach of basic security protocols. They argue that Washington used nuclear negotiations as a deceptive cover for the Feb 1 strikes, effectively pushing European and Arab allies out of the decision-making loop.
“Who gave you permission to turn our region into a battlefield?” — Unnamed Gulf official on the US-Israeli strikes.
The administrative silence has been viewed not as a security necessity but as a jagged disregard for the stability of states hosting US assets. While Donald Trump has long emphasized personal rapport with monarchs, that social veneer has failed to translate into a cohesive regional defense plan.
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| Actor | Action | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Unilateral strike on Tehran | Regional exposure; allies left uninformed |
| Iran | Symmetrical drone/missile volleys | Gulf infrastructure damaged; UAE targeted |
| Gulf States | De-escalation attempts | Independent backchannels to Iran; growing US resentment |
| Israel | Joint strike participant | Minimal direct retaliation compared to the Gulf |
Economic Misses and Marginalized Voices
Beyond the kinetic fallout, a secondary friction exists in the economic isolation of smaller Gulf players. During the 2025 presidential visit, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman were excluded from bilateral audiences. This absence blocked potential long-term energy deals and tariff exemptions.
Kuwait and Bahrain sought long-term LNG offtake agreements with US firms that never materialized.
Oman and Bahrain were unable to leverage existing Free Trade Agreements to dodge new US tariffs.
The administration’s focus remained on high-dollar transactional security with larger neighbors, ignoring the asymmetrical economic needs of the smaller GCC members.
Context: The De-escalation Divergence
The tension is rooted in a fundamental split in survival logic. While the Trump administration pursues a policy of direct confrontation and maximum pressure on Iran, the Gulf states have spent the last year attempting to de-escalate with Tehran to avoid precisely the scenario currently unfolding.
Historically, these nations remained dependent on the US for security. However, the first year of Trump's second term has signaled that this dependence is a liability when the "protector" initiates a war without securing the perimeter. The Gulf is no longer just a spectator or a staging ground; it is a sponge for the overflow of a conflict it warned would be devastating. Under the current reality, personal friendship with the White House does not equate to sovereign safety.
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